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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The state appeals from the district court's order suppressing evidence 
obtained as the result of a blood draw. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
A sheriff's deputy observed a car driven at speeds in excess of 60 miles 
per hour in a marked 25 mile per hour zone. (R., p. 7.) The car stopped in 
response to the deputy's lights, and the deputy made contact with the car's 
driver, Micah Wulff. (Id.) Wulff admitted he "shouldn't be driving" and his car 
smelled strongly of an alcoholic beverage. (Id.) Wulff admitted drinking, and 
failed field sobriety tests. (Id.) Wulff stated he would not participate in a breath 
test so the deputy transported him to a hospital. (Id.) Wulff initially resisted 
giving a blood sample, but "ultimately allowed the nurse to perform a blood 
draw." (R., pp. 7-8.) 
The state charged Wulff with felony DUI. (R., pp. 44-45.) Wulff moved to 
suppress the results of the blood draw.1 (R., pp. 52-56.) The district court 
granted the motion, concluding that implied consent is no longer a valid 
exception to the warrant requirement. (R., pp. 95-108.) The state filed a timely 
notice of appeal. (R., pp. 111-13.) 
1 The result of the test was a .217 BAC. (R., p. 105, n.3.) 
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ISSUES 
Did the district court err when it concluded that implied consent is not a 
valid exception to the warrant requirement? 
2 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Concluded That The Implied Consent Exception 
Does Not Apply In This Case Because The Exigency Exception Does Not Apply 
In This Case 
A. Introduction 
The district court concluded that Missouri v. McNeely, _ U.S. _, 133 
S.Ct. 1552 (2013), "places new limits on the ability of law enforcement to conduct 
a blood test without a warrant." (R., p. 100.) The district court then held that 
implied consent does not justify a warrantless blood draw. (R., pp. 100-04.) The 
district court's determination that McNeely eliminated the implied consent 
exception is erroneous, and therefore the district court's suppression order 
should be reversed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a district court order granting or denying a 
suppression motion is bifurcated: factual findings are accepted unless clearly 
erroneous, but the Court freely reviews the application of constitutional principles 
to the facts found. State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 
(2009). 
C. The District Court Erred By Concluding That Consent To BAC Testing By 
Blood Draw May Not Be Implied By Law 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. 
"A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain 
special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. 
Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Coolidge v. 
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New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); see also State v. Ferreira, 133 
Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999).) Consent is such an 
exception to the warrant requirement, and may be implied under Idaho's implied 
consent statute. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302-03, 160 P.3d 739, 741-42 
(2007). 
In its analysis the district court concluded that the McNeely decision by the 
Supreme Court of the United States requires a warrant unless exigent 
circumstances or actual consent justify the warrantless search. (R., pp. 100-01.) 
The district court thus effectively held that a blood draw may not be justified by 
implied consent. By holding that implied consent is not a valid exception to the 
warrant requirement, the district court erred. 
This Court has clearly stated that consent and exigent circumstances are 
different exceptions to the warrant requirement. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160 
P.3d at 741 ("Exigency, however, is not the lone applicable exception here; 
consent is also a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement."). The 
Supreme Court of the United States recognized this as well in McNeely. In that 
case the only question before the Court was "whether the natural metabolization 
of alcohol in the bloodstream presents a per se exigency that justifies an 
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for nonconsensual 
blood testing in all drunk-driving cases." McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1556. The Court 
held that "exigency in this context must be determined case by case based on 
the totality of the circumstances." Id. Thus, the issue was limited to 
"nonconsensual blood testing" (emphasis added) and the holding was limited to 
4 
the exigent circumstances exception. Moreover, in addressing whether a case-
by-case analysis under the exigency exception would "undermine the 
governmental interest in preventing and prosecuting drunk-driving offenses," the 
Court specifically stated that states would still "have a broad range of legal tools 
to enforce their drunk-driving laws and to secure BAC evidence without 
undertaking warrantless nonconsensual blood draws," including "implied consent 
laws." kL at 1565-66. Far from holding that the state may not legally imply 
consent by a motorist, the Court apparently endorsed implied consent laws.2 
Consent is a valid exception to the warrant requirement, and such 
exception may be implied by law. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302-03, 160 P.3d at 741-
42. This exception applies regardless of the applicability of the exigency 
exception. kL; see also State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709,712-13, 184 P.3d 215, 
218-19 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Even if the exigent circumstances exception was 
inapplicable, the blood draw was valid pursuant to DeWitt's implied consent."). 
The district court's conclusion that implied consent is not a valid exception to the 
warrant requirement, and therefore the state must show exigency or actual 
consent, was erroneous. 
2 The district court also concluded that the state's argument that "the warrantless 
blood draw was proper under Idaho's Implied Consent Statute" was 
"contradictory to a reasonable interpretation of the implied consent statute, I.C. § 
18-8002." (R., pp. 102-03.) Idaho appellate courts "have long held that a driver 
has no legal right to resist or refuse evidentiary testing." State v. LeClercq, 149 
Idaho 905, 909, 243 P.3d 1093, 1097 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing cases back to 
1989). The district court lacked authority to overrule the interpretation of the 
implied consent statute by Idaho appellate courts and was not at liberty to ignore 
that binding precedent. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state requests that the district court's order suppressing the evidence 
obtained by the blood draw be reversed and the matter remanded for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 14th day of November, 
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